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The difficulties encountered by traditional command-and-
control ("CAC") regulation1 in effectively solving the environ-
mental problems facing the United States and the planet have led
to the development, over the last quarter century, of revolution-
ary market-based approaches.2  These approaches advance
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' "Command-and-control" (CAC) is often used in the administrative law
context to describe the proactive regulatory approach associated with the
second wave" of health, safety, and environmental regulation in this country
beginning in the late 1960s. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Associate Professor,
School of Law & School of the Environment, Duke University, Prepared
Statement Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate
(Mar. 8, 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File [hereinafter
Wiener Statement]. Although the Chicago school has often decried this
approach as paternalistic and disrespectful of private choice, CAC regulation
has been justified as correcting for imperfect information in a free market
system and facilitating the attainment of collective goals. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Administrative Substance, 1991 DuKE L.J. 607, 609 & n.10, 622 (1991).
CAC techniques often employ nation-wide standards mandating specific
technological requirements, e.g., "Best available technology" or BAT. See id. at
627; Wiener Statement. There is some evidence, however, that the standards
can be met by any technology, not just the "best available." See Interview with
Alan S. Miller, Executive Director, Center for Global Change, University of
Maryland, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Miller Interview]; see also
Curtis A. Moore, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Silk Purse or Sow's
Ear?, 2 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 26, 41 (1992) (noting, in the context of
the 1990 Amendments to Title IV of the Clean Air Act allowing sulfur dioxide
(SO2) sources to achieve reductions however they wish, that the mandated
reductions could be met through the use of low-sulfur coals without implemen-
tation of highly efficient or less polluting technologies (footnote omitted)).
2 See generally Sunstein, supra note 1, at 633-34 (discussing the tremendous
potential for regulatory reform in the areas of environment and occupational
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa J Int'l Econ. L.
ambitious environmental regulatory objectives without deterring
economic development. One such approach, emission allowance
trading, is incorporated in the United States at the federal level
through the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.3 These
market-driven alternatives also benefit the private sector, spawning
entrepreneurial ventures that theoretically operate to benefit
industry, government, and the environment.4
On efficiency grounds, these new market-based approaches
appear to satisfy both private and public interests in the quest to
accommodate the dual needs of the natural environment and the
economy.5 The theoretical promise of these programs also has
led to justifiable excitement among those in the expanding field of
international environmental law, who foresee immense possibili-
ties for extending these market-based environmental concepts to
the global arena.6 Given the movement towards democracy and
privatization across Eastern Europe and South America, the
current global political climate seems particularly ripe for the
introduction of market-based incentives for curbing environmental
degradation.7 Many Latin American countries lead the way,
working toward market-based environmental regulation of
greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions via bilateral agreements with
industrialized nations that are designed to promote sustainable
health and safety via a system of market-based incentives). For a recent version
of the argument that command-and-control regulation has failed in the area of
environmental regulation in the United States, and for an overview of the pros
and cons of market-based alternatives, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Foreword:
The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L-J. 8, 8-12, 17-20
(1996). For a review of successful efforts to employ market-based approaches
in the United States, see discussion, infra Section 2.
1 See 42 U.S.C. S 7651 (Supp. H 1990). Another market-based approach to
environmental regulation is the concept of effluent charges or emissions taxes.
See C. ScHULTZE ET AL., SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1973 BUDGET
368-73 (1972), reprinted in PETER S. MENELL & RIcHARD B. STEWART, ENvI-
RONMENTAL LAW & PoLIcY 377, 377-78 (1994); Richard B. Stewart &
Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy:
Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 109-10 (1992).
4 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
s See discussion infra Section 4.1.
6 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global. Toward the Transformation
of International Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 241, 254-55
(1995); Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 103-09.
7 See Daniel J. Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe:





development! Such a system would encourage investment by
industrialized countries in the developing regions, spurring
economic growth and the development of emissions reduction
technology in return for tradeable credits towards mandatory
global emissions limits.'
Proponents of such a system recognize the thorny questions
that surround the practical development of market-based regula-
tions. These issues include the difficulty of establishing an
international institutional framework for developing, administer-
ing, and policing such a system. 0 A global regulatory body
could be resisted as a threat to national sovereignty.11 Ideally,
the institutional barriers to the development of an international
system for emissions trading will be overcome given the interests
at stake. The global phenomenon of environmental degradation
increases the need for international coordination of remedial
efforts, while making the issue more contentious.12
While acknowledging administrative questions, the proponents
of market-based regulation ignore the equity issues involved in the
implementation of such an ambitious regulatory system.13 Emis-
' See Stephen Petricone et al., Discussion White Paper: Joint Implementation,
cornpiled at the Hemispheric Energy Symposium, Washington, DC (Oct. 29-31,
1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter White Paper]. On sustainable
development generally, see Udi Helman, Sustainable Development: Strategies for
Reconciling Environment and Economy in the Developing World, WASH. Q.,
Autumn 1995, at 189. The concept of sustainable devel-opment calls for the
reconciliation of economic and ecological objectives and policy in the pursuit
of development goals. See id. Current development needs are not to be
fulfilled without an eye to environmental health and safety concerns of future
generations. Thus, sustainable development speaks both to international and
intergenerational equity concerns. See THE WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OuR COMMON FUTURE 8-9 (1987).
" See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 105-06.
10 See Jonathan Green & Philippe Sands, Establishing an International
System for Trading Pollution Rights, Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA), at 80 (Feb. 12,
1992).
1 See id.
12 See Developments in the Law - International Environmental Law, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1492-94 (1991) [hereinafter Developments] (noting the
failure of vague customary international law standards to reconcile the
transboundary nature of international environmental degradation with the
inflexible sovereign interests of the nation-state decision-makers).
13 See, e.g., Green & Sands, supra note 10 (The authors discuss the
sovereignty question and many of the equity issues associated with developin
an emissions trading regime that endows the right to pollute with legal
recognition. For further development of these issues, see discussion inra
1997]
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sions trading systems are premised on the controversial idea that
pollution rights can be endowed with legal status as property and
divided among nations and private industry. The equity problem
also has an institutional element. Scholars and policymakers must
determine what entity, under an international emissions trading
scheme, will allocate initial entitlements to such rights and based
on what criteria. Professor Jeffrey L. Dunoff identifies "the
ability of a small minority of nations to set the international
environmental agenda and effectively to determine the success or
failure of multilateral environmental initiatives" 14 as a problem
hampering the movement towards "globalization" of international
environmental policymaking. Given the obvious efficiency
benefits, it is questionable whether a system of international
emissions trading really creates an equal playing field, allowing
each country with a stake to bargain effectively in order to
promote its best economic and environmental interests.
This Comment examines the institutional and equitable
feasibility of implementing an international system of emissions
trading rights, focusing on the conceptual and practical problem
of creating and allocating such rights to pollute. Section 2
examines the legal development of market-based approaches to
environmental regulation in this country. Section 3 traces the
development and application of Joint Implementation, which was
intended as a threshold mechanism to facilitate the transition from
domestic strategies for emissions trading to a global framework,
in the wake of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change in Berlin."
Section 4.2. The authors, however, do not propose any potential solutions to
the problem of distribution of pollution credits or of enforcement.). Other
authors who do treat these questions more thoroughly either fail to choose a
preferable system or conclude that international emissions trading is simply
unfeasible on equitable grounds. See infra note 199 and accompanying text; cf.
Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
300,343 (1995) (indicating the potential distributional concerns that would stem
from the conclusion that pollution trading arguments fail on democracy
grounds).
14 Dunoff, supra note 6, at 242.
15 See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 523 n.435 (1993)
("As the Indian delegation observed at INC 4 [the Fourth Conference of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on
Climate Change at Geneva, June 19-28, 1991], joint implementation is a halfway




In Section 4, this background provides the context for evaluat-
ing the practicality of implementing such a scheme on a global
level. This section first addresses the institutional concerns, often
examined by the economists, academics, and legal practitioners, of
a threat to national sovereignty. The focus of Section 4, however,
is on the overlooked equity concerns presented by such a
proposal. This analysis includes a dissection of the property and
sovereignty implications of administering and policing a system of
global emissions trading.
This Comment concludes that the development of a fully
operational international market in emission allowances is feasible
and desirable in light of recent developments in the area of
international environmental cooperation. Nonetheless, equity
concerns regarding the implications such a system presents for
both the domestic and the international concepts of property
rights have been ignored by economists, academics, and policyma-
kers. In order for the ambitious goals enumerated by the parties
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change to be met, this
legal obstacle must be confronted and surmounted. If this
challenge is met, there is no telling how far the riches of market-
based environmental regulation could extend.
2. EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
LEGACY OF THE 1990 AMENDMENTS TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Emissions trading began to attract substantial scholarly and
public attention with the issuance of the landmark U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council6 and the subsequent passage of the 1990 Amendments
16 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron is renowned for its delineation of a two-
step approach to substantive judicial review of a U.S. administrative agency
action, an alternative to the concept of "hard-look" review. See id. at 84243;
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). "Hard-look" review is narrow in scope under the
arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 5 U.S.C.A. S 706(2)(A) governing rulemaking procedure. Under the
"hard-look" standard, a reguation will be upheld if the agency has provided a
solid rationale for its decision. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 4243. Under the
Chevron two-step approach, a regulation will withstand judicial scrutiny if it
follows the express mandate of organic legislation, or, should the meaning of
the statute be ambiguous on a particular point at issue, if it constitutes a
reasonable interpretation of that legislation. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
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to the Clean Air Act. 7 Yet, long before these events, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") developed innovative
incentive-based approaches to domestic environmental regulation.
In fact, the EPA began experimenting with emissions trading
programs in 1974,18 implementing offset, bubbling, netting, and
banking strategies, 9 in the search for an environmental regulato-
ry technique that, unlike traditional CAC, would not pose a
significant threat to development goals.20
Conceptually, all four EPA strategies sought to reduce costs by
transferring pollution control to the polluters themselves, allowing
a plant flexibility in the management of its own emissions sourc-
es.21  In practice, this meant that, on the intra-facility level,
emissions from one unit within a plant could increase pollution
as long as net plant emissions decreased (called "bubbling and
netting").Y During the 1980s, the offset strategy facilitated the
continued development of new sources,2 even in non-attainment
areas,24 by making such development contingent upon a decrease
17 42 U.S.C. S 7651 (1990).
" See Brennan Van Dyke, Note, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid
Deposition, 100 YALE LJ. 2707, 2707 (1991), and sources cited therein.
19 See id.; see also R. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION:
THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE (1986), reprinted in PETER S.
MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 388,
388-93 (1994).
20 See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 20, at 387-88 (1994).
21 See Gary E. Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset
Policyfor Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENvTL. L. 623, 631 (1992); Van Dyke,
supra note 19, at 2707.
2 See LIROFF, supra note 20, at 388-91. The concept of banking facilitates
a bubbling or offset transaction by providing for a central ledger where credits
are recorded and saved. These credits would then be available for trading
within and between emissions sources. See id. at 391, 393.
A "new source" is "any stationary source [building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant], the construction of
which is commenced after the publication of regulations ... prescribing a
standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such
source." 42 U.S.C. S 7411(a)(2)-(3).
4 A non-attainment area is "any area that does not meet (or that
contributes to ambient air quality in a nearby area that does not meet) thenational primary or secondary ambient air quality standard for the pollutant."
42 U.S.C. S 7407(d)(1)(A)(i). Large cities like Los Angeles, New York and
Philadelphia are generally classified as non-attainment areas. See MENELL &




in existing source emissions.2
It was not until 1984, however, that emissions trading came to
national attention with Justice Stevens' majority opinion in
Chevron.26  Ironically, Chevron's profound impact on adminis-
trative law and judicial review overshadowed the fact that the
decision upheld as reasonable an EPA regulation which defined
"stationary source" under the Clean Air Act according to an
emissions trading concept whereby "all the pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping [were to be treated]
as though they were encased within a single 'bubble."'" One
commentator has noted that "[w]e tend to remember Chevron for
its administrative law innovation, but to forget that it was
precisely [the] EPA's determination to devise a market-based
regulatory approach in the face of statutory ambivalence that
opened this door."2' Thus, stamped with official judicial approv-
al, Congress proceeded to incorporate trading principles into
existing environmental legislation with the passage of the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act.29
The 1990 Amendments differ from previous attempts at
emissions trading because they specifically sets up a market system
for trade in sulfur dioxide ("SO 2") allowances to reduce acid
deposition to predetermined levels through three phases, culminat-
ing in the attainment of permanent limits (the "emissions cap") in
the year 2010.30 More importantly, however, the trading scheme
envisioned by the 1990 Amendments no longer relied on a CAC
system grounded in "best-available-control-technology" ("BACT")
standards. 31  This development was revolutionary in that it
represented the U.S. government's first tangible attempt to
reconcile the seemingly incompatible goals of preserving environ-
15 See LIROFF, supra note 20, at 391.
26 467 U.S. 837.
' Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
21 Wiener Statement, supra note 1.
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651.
30 See 42 U.S.C. SS 7651b(a)(1), 7651c(a), 7651d(a); Van Dyke, supra note 19,
at 2708-09, 2711.
31 See Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2708 n.7. BACT standards are
characteristic of CAC regulation in that they are imposed nation-wide, allowing
little consideration for variations among facilities and geographic regions. They
theoretically require polluters to reduce emissions as much as is technically and
economically possible. See id. For a discussion of CAC regulation, see supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
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mental integrity, while promoting economic development. One
commentator notes that "it is not necessarily optimal to reduce
pollution by the greatest amount possible, no matter what the cost
to society . ... Market schemes allow society to choose which
risks are acceptable."
32
With this philosophy in mind, Congress expressly mandated,
for the first time in the history of environmental regulation, that
cost-benefit concerns take ultimate precedence over some amor-
phous conception of the greater environmental good. In practical
application, however, the most successful domestic programs
employing trading schemes have employed a balance between
CAC goals and market flexibility.
33
One unique feature of the 1990 Amendments is that they
include a provision that establishes that tradeable emissions
allowances are not equivalent to rights to pollute. Section 7651b()
of the Clean Air Act now provides that "[a]n allowance allocated
under this subchapter is a limited authorization to emit sulfur
dioxide .... [and] does not constitute a property right."34 By
characterizing an emissions permit as a temporary and limited
privilege, Congress effectively ensured that polluters would not
receive a legally recognized property right to pollute. This
appears to be a simple and expedient measure to implement on the
domestic level to avoid the potentially devastating legal and
political consequences of creating such a right.35 The property
32 See Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2708 n.7.
31 See id. at 2709. One of the first proposed applications of trading was in
the area of ozone non-attainment: the South Coast Air Quality Management
District's ("SCAQMD") Regional Clean Air Incentives Market ("RECLAIM")
program was announced in 1992 and went into effect January 1, 1994, after
approval from the California Air Resources Board. See California Air Board
Approves 'RECLAIM" Trading Program Created by SCAQMD, UTIL. ENV'T
REP., Mar. 18, 1994, at 3; Moore, supra note 1, at 40. The RECLAIM program
illustrates the futility of providing for such flexibility in emissions reductions
without the imposition of some relatively stringent requirements; in September
1995, SCAQMD approved new guidelines incorporating BACT processes into
power plant emission requirements. See SCAQMD Approves "BA CT" Revisions
that Systemize Plant Compliance, UTIL. ENV'T REP., Sept. 15, 1995, at 7.
34 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f); see Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2708 n.10.
35 But see Moore, supra note 1, at 40 (arguing that S 7651b(f) does
characterize air pollution as a "right" for the first time). Moore's hypothesis
that air pollution was given the status of a property right under the 1990
Amendments is directly contradicted by the very language of S 7651b(f). See




question is not so easily dismissed, however, when the concept of
emissions trading is applied on a bilateral or international level
due to the multiplication of interests at stake and the many legal
systems implicated. 6  Utilizing this basic groundwork for
understanding emissions trading at the domestic level, this
comment will address the the potentialities and problems, some
realized and some hypothetical, of applying such a system on an
international scale.
3. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION: TENTATIVE STEPS TOwARDS A
GLOBAL TRADING REGIME
3.1. The Rio Earth Summit and the FCCC
1992 represented a major turning point in the evolution of
international environmental law, witnessing the adoption of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("FCCC")" and its
concomitant signing during the Earth Summit at Rio. 8 Over
one hundred countries thereby committed themselves to reducing
global GHG emissions.39 The stated objective of the FCCC is
"to achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations...
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within
a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally...
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
36 See discussion infra Section 4.3.
3 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
[hereinafter FCCC].
" On December 22, 1989, the General Assembly of the United Nations
voted by Resolution 228 to accept Brazil's invitation to convene a conference
on environment and development in Rio in 1992. See G.A. Res. 44/228, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 151, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989); LYNTON
KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EMERGENCE
AND DIMENSIONS 93 (2d ed. 1990); Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio:
InsuringA ainst Global Warming, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 445, 445 & n.1 (1992).
The Assembly also establshed the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
(INC) to draft a Framework Convention on Climate Change to be signed at
the conference. See Protection of Global Climate 
for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind, G.A. Res. 45/212, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No.
49A, at 147, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990); Stone, supra at 445 & n.2.3. See White Paper, supra note 8.
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manner."
4°
Article 4.2a of the FCCC provides the most significant
impetus for the future implementation of market strategies in
dealing with global climate change. It declares that the signatory
Parties,
taking into account the difference in these Parties' starting
points and approaches, economic structures and resource
bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable econom-
ic growth, available technologies ... , as well as the need
for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of
these Parties to the global effort[,] .... may implement
... policies and measures jointly with other Parties... in
contributing to the achievement of the objective of the
[FCCC].
4 1
Thus, Joint Implementation ("JI") was conceived as the first step
towards global emissions trading strategies. 42  Designed to
incorporate market strategies in meeting the goals of the FCCC,
JI facilitates cooperation in promoting reductions in GHG
emissions by providing cost-effective and mutually beneficial
options to all participants. 43 On the most rudimentary level, all
JI initiatives involve investment by wealthier nations in emissions
reduction strategies within developing nations, which theoretically
results in a net decrease in global air pollution with the corre-
sponding benefit of sustainable economic development. 44
3.2. The Berlin Conference and the "No Credits" Compromise
At the March-April 1995 First Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change held in Berlin,
Germany ("Berlin Conference" or "COP-i"), JI became the official
consensus policy as "Activities Implemented Jointly" ("AIJ").45
Although JI may hypothetically include a program of awarding
40 FCCC, supra note 38, at 849.
41 Id.
42 See supra note 16.






emissions reduction credits that would effectively produce a
trading scheme, it also may simply take form by the establishment
of "umbrella or joint targets that apply to a group of countries
collectively ([or] creating 'bubbles')."46 In other words, credits
and trading are not necessary components of JI4  As a conse-
quence, one of the two consensus decisions on AIJ reached by the
participants in Berlin mandated that "'[n]o credits shall accrue to
any [p]arty as a result of greenhouse gas emissions reduced or
sequestered during the pilot phase from activities implemented
jointly.'" 48  This so-called pilot phase is scheduled to remain in
effect until December 31, 1999, and will include an annual review
process to evaluate the possibility of an early transition to a more
fully operational mode.49
COP-1 saw to the formation of the subsidiary bodies of the
FCCC, including the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate
("AGBM"), the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice ("SBSTA"), the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 ("AG13"),
and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation ("SBI"). AGBM,
developed to begin the process of assessing appropriate action to
be taken after the year 2000, has proved itself to be the most
active subsidiary body, meeting six times in the two years since
the Berlin Conference.
One of the most important issues addressed by AGBM has
been the strengthening of commitments in Article 4.2a of
developed countries via the adoption of a legally-binding proto-
col.' The Second Conference of the Parties ("COP-2"), held in
Geneva in July 1996, reflected the progress made via AGBM with
the shift in position by the United States which now supports the
legally-binding protocol to fulfill the lofty goals of the Berlin
Mandate." The participants at Geneva concluded their Confer-
46 Bodansky, supra note 16, at 520.
41 See discussion of the political forces that led to this compromise in policy
at the Berlin Conference infra Section 3.4.
41 White Paper, supra note 8 (quoting the "Activities Implemented Jointly").
49 See id.
'0 See Report of the Meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int'l Inst. for
Sustainable Dev., New York, NY.), Dec. 23, 1996 [hereinafter Report of the
Meetings].
" See id. This by no means indicates that the United States has adopted
a position supporting a true crediting system before the year 2000. In fact, in
a discussion regarding AIJ at the meetings of the subsidiary bodies of the
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ence with the "Geneva Declaration," calling for legally-binding
objectives and major reductions in GHGs. 2  COP-2, however,
brought out many of the ongoing debates on the desirability of
legally-binding standards and the desirability of a full system of
crediting under the FCCC.'3 As such, the parties anticipated the
need for much work in the interim before the commencement of
COP-3 in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997.5'
Stephen Petricone of the United Nations Development
Programme ("UNDP") in San Jose, Costa Rica, who worked
extensively on JI efforts in Costa Rica observed that the "no
credits" restriction imposed on the pilot phase translates into the
most significant obstacle facing the further development of JI and
of an international emissions market.55 Petricone opines that it
is naive to
[e]xpect[] this pilot phase to reveal whether there would be
demand for JI in a post-pilot or operational phase .... Its
[sic] kind of like a McDonald's that wants to test-market
a hamburger, but does not want to invest in the meat until
[it] knows there will be enough demand for it.
56
Despite the hesitancy of the initial steps towards international -I
projects that are exacerbated by the restrictions of the pilot phase
consensus policy, several JI programs have succeeded at national
levels, including ones in which the United States played an
FCCC in Geneva in December 1996, the United States joined China in calling
for language in the Secretariat's document on Uniform Reporting Format for
AIJ rejecting credits for AIJ emissions reductions during the pilot phase. See
id. The United States did feel, however, that the pilot phase should consider
all issues of AIJ, including crediting. See id. Furthermore, at the same meeting,
the United States came out strongly in favor of an international emissions
trading program to be implemented after the expiration of the pilot phase. See
infra notes 85-87, 226-29 and accompanying text.
52 See id.
s For further discussion, see infra Section 3.4.
5 See Report 9fthe Meetings, supra note 51. In 1997, the subsidiary bodies
to the FCCC will meet on several more occasions in Bonn, Germany, before
the convening of COP-3.
" Electronic Mail Interview with Stephen Petricone, United Nations







The U.S. national JI program, United States Initiative on Joint
Implementation ("USIJI"), began accepting project proposals in
November 1994.8 Seven projects were accepted from the first
round of submissions on February 3, 1995,59 including three
from Costa Rica, which constituted the most projects from any
single country." Costa Rica initiated its own national JI pro-
gram, termed the Oficina Costarricense de Implementacion
Conjunta ("CROJI") in June 1994.61
USIJI announced the approval of eight more projects aimed at
reducing GHGs in developing nations on December 19, 1995.62
On December 6, 1996, the USIJI Secretariat, co-chaired by the
Department of Energy ("DOE") and the EPA, announced the
seven projects accepted in the third round of submissions. 63
Thus far, the two main types of JI projects accepted are land use
and energy initiatives." The former includes forest preservation
and reforestation proposals,6 while the energy projects include
57 "The U.S. effort on joint implementation began in October 1993 as part
of the Clinton administration's Climate Change Action Plan, which outlines
what the United States intends to do to meet its treaty commitments."
Greenhouse Gases: Seven Projects Accepted for Inclusion in U.S. Initiative on Joint
Implementation, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Envirn Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Greenhouse Gases].
" See White Paper, supra note 8.
'9 See id, For a sampling of some of the creative initiatives proposed by
U.S. utility companies under USIJI see GPU CEO Joins Energy Secretary
O'Leary in Costa Rica, PR NEWSWIRE, June 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; Greenhouse Gases, supra note 58; Peter Passell, For
Utilities, New Clean-Air Plan: A Swap May Lead to a Global Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1994, at Cl; U.S. Energy Companies Join with Conservation Groups to
Help Conserve Endangered Tropical Forest in Belize and Mitigate Greenhouse
Gases, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
6' See Petricone Interview, supra note 56.
61 See White Paper, supra note 8.
62 See Worldview Climate Change: U.S. O.Ks More Joint Implementation
Projects, GREENWIRE, Dec. 21, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 12/21/95 APN-
GR 23.
63 See id., GREENWIRE, Dec. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File; Seven New Projects Were Chosen Under the Joint Implementation,
INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED. LANDS, Dec. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Seven New Projects].
6' See White Paper, supra note 8.
65 See id.
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fuel switching or renewable energy programs which operate to
reduce the use of carbon-based fuels and to increase energy
efficiency.66
3.3. The Benefits and Obstacles to Effective Joint Implementation
Understanding the theoretical benefits and problems with JI
provides a powerful tool for appreciating the obstacles currently
blocking achievement of a true international emissions trading
program. As an initial matter, however, it must be re-emphasized
that the pilot phase for international JI projects does not allow for
emissions crediting.6 7 Accordingly, the problems associated with
the development of legal regimes appropriate for the allocation
and administration of those unique rights to pollute are not at
issue for JI at this point in time.
The perceived potential benefits for the investor or home
country (most likely a wealthy industrialized nation) in JI projects
include: (1) increases in cost-effective emissions mitigation
options, including "the potential future value of the offsets if they
become credits";68 (2) provision of a "platform for business
development activity;"69 (3) an opportunity for "[d]irect involve-
ment in policy making;"70 and (4) significant public relations
gains."1 The benefits for the host developing nation include the
receipt of foreign capital, the "[t]ransfer of modern, clean efficient
technologies," and the "[c]reation of local environmental and
social benefits." 72 A mutual benefit would be the "[e]xport of a
clean commodity" from developing countries with a "natural
66 See id. At least two-thirds of GHGs somehow relate to fossil fuel
combustion. Fossil fuels cause most of the increase in carbon dioxide, which
accounts for the most significant increase in radiative forcing (warming). See
Alan S. Miller, Symposium on Clinton's New Land Policies: Energy Policy from
Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to Market Facilitator, 25 ENVTL. L. 715,
722 & n.64 (citing RADIATIVE FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE 1994
REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUP OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC") at 11, 18, 23.)
Therefore, switching to non-carbon-based fuels will result in a net decrease in
GHGs.
61 For further discussion, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.








comparative advantage in the production and export of greenhouse
gas offsets."7 3
Perhaps most vexing of the existing obstacles to JI results from
the lack of financing availability in connection with the "no
credits" directive of the pilot phase!74 There are other equally
troublesome obstacles in the establishment of JI programs that
signal problems to come in the struggle to develop a true trading
regime. These hurdles include the perception among some in the
private sector that acceptance procedures devised by governments
for JI proposals are too burdensome or costly.75 The lack of
clear guidelines as to what constitutes a technically feasible JI
project further complicates this obstacle.7 6 In fact, many host
countries entirely failed to produce JI project criteria or even to
ratify the FCCC.' Some have noted the need for a verification
mechanism and transparent methodology for measuring GHG
benefits due to JI. s Another difficulty lies in transaction costs
incurred when identifying potential projects and investors without
development of a central registry like those used for banking
strategies under the Clean Air Act.79
Finally, many potential JI participants expressed "uncertainty
regarding the future status of JI or value of credits." 0 Some
developing nations also fail to see the equity in JI proposals,
claiming that such projects "shift[] the responsibility for action
from rich to poor nations and encourage[] industrialized states -






7' See 1996 Year-end Update, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int'l Inst. for
Sustainable Dev., New York, NY.), Jan. 13, 1997 (discussing participants'
observations at the UNEP Conference ("UNEP Conference") on AIJ in San
Jose, California in October 1996).
71 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
o White Paper, supra note 8. At the UNEP Conference, a number of the
100 participants drawn from governments, the private sector, and NGOs,
"argued that the current lack of credits and uncertainty over their future
availability is the main reason the private sector lacks enthusiasm for investing
in AJ projects." 1996 Year-end Update, supra note 79. Japan and the United
States have responded to this lack of private sector enthusiasm by providing in-
kind, non-monetary incentives for industry participation AIJ. See id.
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continue polluting the atmosphere while hindering development
in the South[ern hemisphere]." 8' Nations which have traditional-
ly supported JI include the United States, Norway, the Nether-
lands, Germany, Canada, Costa Rica, Chile, and South Africa.
8 2
JI's opposition from the developing world, however, includes
China, the Philippines, Brazil, the OPEC nations, Malaysia, and
India. 3
At AGBM-5 in Geneva in December 1996, the United States
came out strongly in favor of international emissions trading
among the Parties assuming a binding quantified emissions target,
citing many of the obstacles facing the effective implementation
of JI projects without a true crediting system.84 The unofficial
U.S. position paper from Geneva states that "[ilt is critical that
provisions for international greenhouse gas emissions trading and
joint implementation be included in the Kyoto agreement in order
to meet the new commitments at the lowest cost."" Not
1 Leah Makabenta, Environment! New North-South Rift Feared over Climate
Change, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File. Some participants at the UNEP Conference expressed
concerns that A-J could (1) become a mechanism for the North to transfer
responsibility for cutting GHGs to the South; (2) weaken technological
innovation native to developing countries; and (3) "encourage the dumping of
obsolete or socially and environmentally harmful technologies in recipient
countries." 1996 Year-end Update, supra note 79.
" See Petricone Interview, supra note 56. Mexico slowly moved towards
a pro-JI position in 1996, culminating in its selection as a host for a USIJI
project selected in December 1996. See Seven New Projects, supra note 64; see
also Edward A. Hoyt, Credit Where Credit Is Due: Environmental and Energy
Agencies Evaluate Carbon Emissions Credits, BUSINESS MEXICO, May 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (debating the pros and cons of
Mexican participation in JI, and the potential for crediting).
" See Petricone Interview, supra note 56; Haig Simonian, UN Conference
on Climate Change: Opposing Theorists Go into Battle or the World, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1995, at 8. In the wake of the Berlin Conference, the United States
and India announced a "Common Agenda" under which, among other
sustainable development objectives, the United States will help India reduce
GHG emissions from electricity generation. See U.S., India "Common Agenda"
Project to Begin with Greenhouse Gas Reductions, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA),
May 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Curnws File.
" See U.S. Dept. of State, Climate Change: U.S. Non-Paper, December
1996, at 5-7 [hereinafter Non-Paper]; Administration to Stand Ground on
Emissions Trading: U.S. Climate Proposals Find Little Support at Geneva
Negotiations, INSIDE E.P.A. WEEKLY REP., Dec. 20, 1996, at 1, 6 [hereinafter
Little Support]; Global Warming: U.S. Pushing for International Emissions
Trading Program, CLEAN AIR REP., Dec. 12, 1996, at 19-20.




surprisingly, developing nations vigorously opposed this proposal,
objecting that developed nations should take the first steps toward
reduction of GHGs.s6 This dispute over the future success of JI
without crediting indicates the existing conflict between wealthy
and developing nations since the Berlin Conference. Additionally,
it points towards potential obstacles to be encountered in the
development of a true emissions trading regime.
3.4. Emergent Conflict Between Industrialized and Developing
Nations
As procedural and substantive disagreements began to emerge
at the beginning of the Berlin Conference," several developing
countries evinced a sense of indignation at the industrialized
nations' approach to the resolution of the often conflicting goals
of emissions reduction and sustainable development."8  One
participant noted, "'[w]hen [industrialized nations] provide
transfer[s] of technology to a poor country, the developed nations
expect the world to allow them to carry out environment-
damaging activities in their own countries.' 89 Environmental
issues carry political and social implications that render interna-
tional cooperation all the more difficult. A few developing
nations opposed to JI feel that it constitutes nothing more than an
attempt by wealthier industrialized nations to ease their guilty
86 See Little Support, supra note 85, at 6.
During the first three days of the conference, developed and developing
nations had trouble agreeing on voting procedures. Many developing countries,
including China and India, endorsed a proposal, eventually incorporated into
a Green Paper, of the Alliance of Small Island States ("AOSIS"). This proposal
called for a different protocol which would have developed nations reduce CO,
emissions to pre-1990 levels by the year 2000 (the FCCC calls for reductions
to 1990 levels by 2000). See Ashraf Abdullah, 'No' to Further Pledges on
Reduction of Greenhouse Gases, NEW STRAITS TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1995, at 2
[hereinafter Abdullah, Further Pledges]; Ashraf Abdullah, Resolutions on Global
Warming Curbs May Fail, NEW STRAITS TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1995, at 23 [hereinafter
Resolutions].
88 See Resolutions, supra note 88.
89 Id. (quoting Datuk Renji Sathiah, the Malaysian Ambassador to Belgium,
the head ofthe Malaysian mission to the European Union, and the head of the
Malaysian delegation to the Berlin Conference); see also Abdullah, Further
Pledges, supra note 88 (quoting Lillia Bautista, Chairperson of the Group of 77,
another coalition of small developing nations, as stating, '[w]e are disturbed
with the fact that the developed countries are not doing their job at home and
try to shut us up by offering to transfer their technology.'").
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conscience in furthering environmental degradation by temporari-
ly subsidizing development in the Southern hemisphere."
The results of the Berlin Conference, although a success in the
eyes of many industrialized countries, reflect to a great extent
continuing points of contention between developed and develop-
ing nations.91 One commentator opines that developing coun-
tries actually possess greater bargaining power to further redistri-
bution of wealth in environmental negotiations due to the anxiety
of developed nations regarding global environmental health.92
Such enhanced bargaining capacity, however, fails to eliminate
conflicts between the developed and developing world in the
environmental arena.93 The AIJ and the "no credits" provision
in particular, represent an apparent victory on the part of those
developing nations that rallied enough pressure to hinder consen-
sus policy regarding significant steps towards actual emissions
trading.94
Certain non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") across the
90 See id.
9' The most recent meetings of the subsidiary bodies of the FCCC
highlight some of these tensions. AGBM-5 brought out conflict between the
EU, on the one hand, and developing countries, on the other, regarding the
choice of a mandatory or a more flexible menu approach in establishing
common or coordinated policies and measures ("P&Ms"). In this context, the
delegate from the Group of 77 and China, supported by a coalition of at least
20 other developing nations, referred directly to "concepts such as emission
banking, emission permits and AIJ as attempts to stray from commitments
[under the Berlin Mandate.]" Report of the Meetings supra note 51. The parties
also debated the desirable form and scope of a protocol or other legal
instrument. See id.
' See Stone, supra note 39, at 472.
93 See id.
9' See Ramesh Jaura, Environment: NGOs Disappointed at Berlin Climate
Meet Mandate, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; Haig Simonian, US Is Left Exposed in Chill of Climate
Talks, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at 9.
The response of participants at AGBM-5 in December 1996 to the use of
emissions trading to achieve flexibility in meeting the objectives of Article 4.2a
reflects these ongoing tensions. Norway, Canada, New Zealand and France
were supportive of the idea; Australia noted that a trading regime would need
to address equity concerns. See infra Section 4.3. The United States proposed
banking or borrowing; Egyptpredicted that borrowing might lead to delays in
action; and Malaysia propose a borrowing system where debtors pay interest
that would be used to establish a fund to safeguard against the effect of climate
change. See Report of the Meetings, supra note 51; see also supra notes 85-87 and
accompanying text (discussing the rejection of the U.S. position in favor of




globe focus public attention on international environmental issues
through lobbying, media events, and protest. Some of these
groups, including Greenpeace International, the German World
Wide Fund for Nature ("WWF"), and the Climate Action
Network ("CAN"), joined voices with developing nations in
criticizing the "Berlin Mandate" as insufficient to meet the current
global demand for action on climate change.9 A few environ-
mentalists actually staged a massive protest at the conclusion of
the Berlin Conference. 6 It should be noted, however, that not
all environmentalist organizations criticized the results of the
Berlin Conference." Furthermore, most environmentalists,
particularly the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF"), support JI
efforts as environmentally and economically sound policy.
In the meantime, the reaction of trade industry coalitions
within the United States to the Berlin Conference and its
aftermath varied, but were largely critical of the limits placed on
JI by the pilot phase restrictions.9 A representative of one such
coalition noted, for example, that "'[t]he U.S. caved in and
allowed this paper [AIJ] to be defined without credit, which is a
major incentive for companies and countries to get in-
volved."' 1 ° Industry opinion also responded with criticism to
"I See Jaura, supra note 95.
96 See Ashraf Abdullah, Protestors Storm Climate Meet, NEW STRAITS TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1995, at 8.
97 See EDF Cautiously Praises Progress Made at Berlin Climate Conference,
BUSINESS WiRE, Apr. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
[hereinafter EDP].
9' See Susan Bruniga, Climate Change: Companies Encouraged to Particpate
in Pilot Phase of Joint Implementation, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), May 25,
1995, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Curnws File (quoting Annie Petsonk,
EDF's international counsel, who noted that "JI has tremendous potential for
democracy building and improving the economies' of developing countries,");
EDF, supra note 98; Alice LeBlanc, The Third Wave; Pollution Credit Trading,
ENVTL. ACTION, Jan. 1994, at 24; Passell, supra note 60, at C6.
P See Climate Change: Coalition Protests Joint Implementation, Emissions
Plans Drawn at Climate Meeting, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Apr. 14, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Coalition].
100 Id. (quoting Donald Rheem, a media representative for the Global
Climate Coalition, a non-profit organization of business trade associations and
private companies established to coordinate business participation in scientific
and policy aebate on global climate change); see also Interview: How Utilities
View Latest Climate Policy Moves, GREENWIRE, Oct. 17, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (interviewing Dale Heydlauff, vice-
president for environmental affairs at American Electric Power, chair of the
1997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Intl Econ. L.
the concern of the developing nations that JI functions only as a
mechanism for wealthy nations to make up for years of disregard
for the global environment. 1 The same representative com-
mented that "'if the treaty gets serious, and starts doing something
about emissions - [developing countries are] not going to want
to spend money to do cleanups. They want the [industrialized
nations] to do it all."'102
The industry supports its position by pointing to some
evidence that developing nations will in fact be responsible for the
most significant rise in emissions over the next fifteen years and
that they therefore should respond accordingly by playing an
equal role in JI programs.103 Several members of the U.S. House
of Representatives have also expressed skepticism as to the future
involvement of developing nations in global efforts to reduce
GHG emissions."°4
Unfortunately, the "no credits" provision significantly hinders
industry incentive to get involved with JI projects. 0 5 Unless
industry is satisfied that its investments will be supported by
continuing participation by host developing countries, even after
the pilot phase of JI is completed resulting in either credits or no
credits, such industry will hesitate to supply funding for emissions
reduction solutions."' "The extension of trading to firms as
Global Climate Change Subcommittee at the Edison Electric Institute, and co-
chair of the Department of Energy's Climate Change Program, regarding the
U.S. position of commitment to undefined international emission trading
programs in Geneva in July 1996). "The absence of clearly defined credit has
a chilling effect on [electric utility] industry interest. . . . [Y]ou can certainly
read into the [USII's] criteria [for approving projects] that you would not
qualify for credit if your motivation was profit." Id.
101 See Coalition, supra note 100.
102 Id. (quoting Rheem).
103 See Michael Dwyer, Germany: Berlin Conference All Gas and No
Substance, Says lEA, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Apr. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
104 See Climate Change: House Panel Questions Wirth on U.S. Emission
Reduction Commitments After 2000, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA, May 23,
1995, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Curnws File (discussing the concerns
expressed by Representatives Dan Schaefer (R-Colo.), Frank Pallone cD-NJ),
John Dingell (D-Mich), and Richard Burr R-NC) of the House Subcommittee
on Energy and Power, at a hearing on May 19, 1995, updating members on the
results of the Berlin Conference).
105 See Bruniga, supra note 99.




well as nations would increase substantially economic efficiency
and stimulate environment-friendly technological innovation by
creating a worldwide market in GHG limitation opportuni-
ties."107 Thus, a well-functioning trading regime depends on
industry participation. Furthermore, establishment of a true
trading regime is imperative to ensure the participation of private
parties in global efforts to hinder climate change.
Having sketched a brief history of the FCCC, JI, and the
conflicts emerging thereunder as the Parties move toward the
establishment of an international emissions trading program, this
Comment now evaluates the economic and distributional implica-
tions of the implementation of a full-blown credits regime.
4. ExPANsIoN TO THE GLOBAL ARENA
4.1. The Ejficiency Argument for International Emissions
Tradinglos
In its brief history under the Clean Air Act, emissions trading
already has produced billions of dollars in cost savings."
Emissions trading facilitates the sharing of cleanup costs and
benefits among multiple facilities by allowing one utility company
to make extensive emissions cuts and thereby satisfy the cleanup
requirements of another facility.110 Furthermore, market mecha-
nisms provide incentive for facilities to develop innovative
technologies for more cost-effective and significant emissions
reductions.1 The EPA began substituting market strategies for
107 Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 106.
108 For an excellent overview of the benefits of implementation of market-
based strategies in environmental regulation, see Wiener Statement, supra note
1.
109 See Implementation of the Acid Rain Pro ram: Hearings on the Implemen-
tation of the Acid Rain Provisions of Title IVof the Clean Air Act Amendments
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Energy, 103d
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 5, 1994) (statement of Michael J. Walsh, Senior Econo-
mist, Board of Trade of the City of Chicago), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Cngtst File [hereinafter Walsh Statement] (predicting that market-based
approaches under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act will be a major
success given EPA's estimate as of late 1994 that the annual nationwide cost
of reaching the new emission standard under a CAC regime would be $2-3
billion).
110 See id.
. See Marchant, supra note 22, at 630; Walsh Statement, supra note 110.
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technology-based CAC regimes in the area of SO2 regulation
primarly to encourage industry initive. Under CAC regimes, the
technology chosen by the government effectively captured the
market to the detriment of cleaner and cheaper technologies.
Thus, market strategies theoretically encourage creativity in
the structuring of new green technologies. The most efficient
control technique varies from firm to firm; so, CAC is ultimately
counterproductive on cost grounds because it is impossible for the
government to gather enough information to choose the best
method for each facility.113  Market-driven strategies also decen-
tralize the regulatory process by effectively shifting these policy
decisions from the public to the private sector, closer to centers
of specialized and creative expertise.1 14  "[T]rading programs
eliminate the need for centralized, national determinations of what
technology is 'available' or feasibly available in the future."11
Due to the potentially large advantages of market strategies in
promoting environmental objectives, an expensive CAC regime to
regulate climate change on the international level appears less
viable. Petricone posits that, certainly in the area of greenhouse
gas emissions, 116 CAC regulation is obsolete.117  Furthermore,
the potential economic savings from an international offset project
are in the hundreds of billions of dollars per year for a fully
operational global regime.11
In most developing countries, emissions limitations cost
112 See Dunoff, supra note 6, at 253 (citing Daniel J. Dudek et al.,
Technology-Based Approaches Versus Market-Based Aproaches, in GREENING
INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994)).
113 See Wiener Statement, supra note 1. One commentator argues, based on
the domestic experience under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act,
that new technology will result only if the goals established for global GHG
emission reductions are sufficiently stringent. See Miller Interview, supra note
1. "No new technology has been developed in response to the acid rain
program because it proved to be so easily met." Id.
114 See Marchant, supra note 22, at 630-31.
115 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 635. But see Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 304,
311-18 (arguing that, in the context of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act, "[t]he case for pollution trading programs... must rest where it began -
with efficiency, not democracy").
116 See discussion of the FCCC and the Berlin Conference supra Section 3.
117 See Petricone Interview, supra note 56.




significantly less." 9 Therefore, by allowing developed nations
to invest in reductions elsewhere, the global cost is reduced.12
Consequently, international emissions trading promotes sustain-
able development by providing "a more effective and efficient way
to transfer capital and technology from [industrialized countries]
to [developing countries], on a mutually voluntary basis, to the
benefit of both."12 ' Nonetheless, the institutional, administra-
tive, distributional, and normative obstacles that stand in the way
of a feasible international emissions trading regime are substantial
and seemingly unavoidable." These challenges must be broken
down to understand why and how such a regime can be equitably
implemented.
4.2. The National Sovereignty Challenge
Questions on sovereignty grounds continue to surround the
feasibility of international emissions trading."2 These concerns
motivate the objections from participating nations that perceive
the establishment of institutions to implement an emissions
trading regime as constituting a potential threat to their national
sovereignty. Although such concerns are reasonable, they are
generally misplaced. These fears result from the disparate
concepts of property rights that plague the amorphous constitu-
tion of and remedy for global atmospheric pollution."
Environmental degradation is inherently global in scope. No
invisible walls spontaneously materialize as counterparts to
119 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 106-07; see also Green & Sands,
supra note 10 ("[D]eveloping countries might be able to control more of their
pollution more cheaply than the developed countries.").
120 See Green & Sands, supra note 10; Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at
106-07.
121 Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 108.
12 See Dunoff, supra note 6, at 254-55, and sources cited therein. Petricone
lists the following as the four main obstacles to a true international emissions
market: (1) "[the] collective action dilemma in climate change negotiations,"
see discussion of the conflicts at the Berlin Conference supra Sections 3.2.-3.4.,
(2) the "resistance to the mechanism among some developig countries that
have a particularly strong voice in international negotiations," see discussion
supra Section 3; (3) "the potential complexity of designing the mechanism," see
discussion infra Section 4.3.2.; and (4) "lack of long-time experience with
specific projects," see discussion supra Section 3.
12 See Green & Sands, supra note 10.
124 See discussion infra Section 4.3.
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national boundaries that can be drawn with relative ease either on
land or at sea.1  Accordingly, given that no one nation can be
designated as the source of harmful emissions, climate change is a
particularly appropriate subject through which to analyze the
emerging concepts of international environmental law. As
greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for a long period of
time and migrate across the globe, the precise location of emis-
sions reductions has little effect on the overall greenhouse
effect.1 26 The uniquely global characteristics of environmental
degradation may also provide an explanation for the difficulties
realized by transnational, non-state actors in developing and
facilitating global cooperative solutions to such degradation."
It is important to briefly examine some international environmen-
tal law principles, largely rooted in traditional concepts of
property and sovereignty, which were developed in an attempt to
provide for the security of national sovereignty in the face of
necessary and expedient transnational approaches to environmen-
tal degradation. 28
4.2.1. The Vague Mandate of Principle 21: The
Expanded Doctrine of Sic Utere.
International environmental law as a discipline began to take
shape in Stockholm, Sweden, at the 1972 United Nations Confer-
125 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 83 (describing the atmosphere as
a "global commons").
126 See Bodansky, supra note 16, at 520; see also Stewart & Wiener, supra
note 3, at 104 n.73 (noting that GHG emissions do not present the same
problems with "hot spots" as do many other toxic atmospheric pollutants,
which might create excessive damage should they "bunch" in one location).
127 A full survey and analysis of the various instruments that have
ultimately led to the realization of JI and the potential for international
emissions trading systems is impossible within the scope of this Comment. For
an excellent overview of the development of international environmental law,
see Dunoff, supra note 6, at 24347. For the text of many seminal international
environmental law instruments affecting greenhouse gas emission regulation
prior to the adoption of the Framework Convention on Climate Change at
Rio, see INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL LAW: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
REFERENCES (Edith Brown Weiss et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter BASIC
INSTRUMENTS].
121 See generally Developments, supra note 12, at 1504-21 (noting the failure





ence on the Human Environment ("Stockholm Conference"). 9
Although not binding as a whole,130 the Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment ("Stockholm Declaration")13 1
greatly influenced the subsequent development of international
environmental treaties. Moreover, Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration, generally considered to constitute customary
international law, is expressly referred to in the preamble to
the Framework Convention on Climate Change.133 The United
Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP"), the UN body
responsible for coordinating environmental policy and action
among the other UN bodies, particularly the United Nations
Development Programme ("UNDP"), is also a product of the
Stockholm Conference. 4 Unfortunately, the guidelines provid-
ed by Principle 21 and the Stockholm Declaration as a whole are
vague at best; they do nothing more than recognize the elusive
objective of maintaining state sovereignty in the face of environ-
mental problems that defy ordinary principles of property and
causation. 3
Principle 21, however, serves as the international law counter-
129 One hundred thirteen states participated in the Stockholm Conference.
See BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 128, at 171.
13' See id. at 172; see also Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-Canada Air
Qua!ity Agreement: A Framework for Addressing Transboundary Air Pollution
Problems, 26C ORNELL INT'L L.J. 421, 431 (1993) ("An international agencycan only give force to those international environmental principles that are
directly incorporated into binding agreements or are accepted as customary
international law.") (citations omitted).
131 Stockholm Declaration, Declaration on the Human Environment Done
at Stockholm on 16 June 1972, in Report of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 3 (1973), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/14, at 2-65, and Corr.1 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Decla-
ration].
13 See BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 128, at 172. On customary
international law, see generally Developments, supra note 12, at 1504 ("A rule
of customary international law develops when states follow a constant practice
under the conviction that international law requires their conduct.") (citations
omitted).
1 See FCCC, supra note 38, pmbl.
14 See Dunoff, supra note 6, at 24546; Institutional and Financial
Arrangements for International Environmental Co-operation, G.A. Res. 2997,
pts. I-iH, 27 U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972).
135 See Developments, supra note 12, at 1504-06; Roelofs, supra note 131, at
430-32.
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part to the common law real property doctrine of sic utere.136
Closely related to sic utere doctrine and Principle 21 is the "act-of-
state" doctrine. As enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Underhill v. Hernandez,3 ' the act of state doctrine requires that
"[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
[cannot] sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another,
done within its own territory."13 These traditional concepts of
property and sovereignty work to exclude those actors, whether
individual persons or nations, which do not hold the territorial
rights to real property.39 Thus, it is nearly impossible to assign
fault, or a legal remedy for such fault, in the realm of global
environmental degradation where no one country officially holds
the traditional exclusive property right to clean air.
14
Green and Sands'' equate the rights protected by Principle
21 with a State's sovereignty over its natural resources. 42 In
fact, the language of Principle 21, like the act-of-state doctrine,
does nothing more than transfer the rights and responsibilities of
sic utere from the individual property owner, within his or her
own community, to the sovereignty of individual States in control
of their natural resources, within the international communi-
ty.1
43
Indeed, the sovereignty question is not problematic in and of
itself, as the main objective of international environmental law is
136 See Developments, supra note 12, 1496-98. On sic utere, see generally
BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990). "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas. Common law maxim meaning that one should use his own property
in such manner as not to injure that of another." Id.
137 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
13 Id. at 252.
139 See generally 4 MoRRis COHEN, PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY 155
(1927) ("The essence of private property is always the right to exclude others.").
140 See Developments, supra note 12, at 1498-1521.
141 Jonathan Green is an associate of Coudert Brothers; Philippe Sands is
a director of the Centre for International Environmental Law, Kings College
London. See Green & Sands, supra note 10.
142 See id.
143 States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not damage the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national




to encourage States to enter into international agreements that
somewhat restrict their sovereign right to develop natural
resources. 144 Instead, the sovereignty question rests upon the
larger dilemma of naming and administering the legal rules that
should govern what appears to be a system of property rights in
an area of regulation generally unsusceptible to such a regime. 4
Thus, the real international legal problem surrounding the
creation of a global emissions trading regime concerns the extent
to which a State can inalienably grant emissions rights to another
State, or to a private person or corporation.
14
The establishment of an international system of emissions
trading permits would require the legal recognition of a new sort
of property right; the right to pollute. 47 Such legal status for
emissions rights appears to conflict with existing principles of
permanent sovereignty. Green and Sands posit a hypothetical case
where an emissions permit trade by State A to a private person or
corporation in another country could in principle be revoked in
the name of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
1 41
The same dilemma could emerge in the case of a trade between
two States under international law, especially if parties to the
FCCC were free to withdraw at will. 149 By this argument, the
problem is insurmountable because it requires a transformation of
the principles of customary international law that is unlikely to
occur, at least not before the year 2000, the conclusion of the
pilot phase of AIJ."'5
There lies another solution, however, in the recognition of an
international property right in emissions reduction allowances, a
right which would supersede certain principles of national sover-
eignty in the interest of promoting global environmental health.
Approaching the sovereignty issue from this angle also determines
144 See Green & Sands, supra note 10.
'4 See discussion infra Section 4.3.




"0 The nature of customary international law is such that it can only be
transformed through widespread international acceptance of a new standard for
legal behavior. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. It seems highly
unlikely that States will soon, or ever, abandon the ideal of sovereignty over
their own natural resources.
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which law, international or domestic, governs the rights and
responsibilities of the independently sovereign trading partners
when additional private parties are involved in an emissions
allowance trade.
Traditionally, developing nations argued that international
investment contracts between nations and private parties are not
subject to public international law."'1 However, international
emissions trading cannot be governed solely by principles of
private contract law due to the initial imposition of mandatory
reduction goals by some greater governmental authority.
Industrialized countries thus correctly argued that a trading regime
must somehow be governed by public international law.1 12 If a
trading regime is inherently premised on a new form of interna-
tional property right, then it must also be subject to the rules of
international law, agreed upon by all parties, both public and
private. It is now crucial to identify the more complex equitable
implications of the development of international property rights
to pollute.
4.3. The Real Dilemma - Distributional Concerns in the
Allocation of Rights to Pollute Under an International Emissions
Trading Regime
4.3.1. The Entitlement Question - the Allocation of
Emissions Rights: Who Owns the Rights to Clean
Air?
Questions regarding who owns the right to clean air and, more
importantly, who can buy the right to pollute it are largely a
function of how such a right is defined and who the major parties
are. This is why equity issues in connection with the creation of
an emissions trading regime, which exist even under the domestic
scheme, become far more complicated on the international
level."5 3 The determination of who can obtain rights to pollute
or even the opportunity to pollute is connected intimately with
the system for the distribution of those rights.'- 4 This system
largely depends upon the economic and political status of the
"51 See Green & Sands, supra note 10.
152 See id.
153 See Dunoff, supra note 6, at 254-55.




participant."' 5 The inquiry is even more complicated on a
global scale since what was once merely a two-sided issue - the
rights of polluters versus those of society - expands exponential-
ly.'
5 6
Accordingly, the analysis of the legal matrix for international
emissions trading must begin with a recognition of the type of
entitlement with which emissions trading is concerned. "[A]ny
'pollution trading' system requires the creation of a new form of
property - the rights to be traded."'17  Until the right to
pollute is recognized for what it is - a property right - questions
regarding who should have access to that right are meaningless.
Any comprehensive international market scheme to protect the
global commons, particularly one designed to limit GHG
emissions, must indicate how entitlements will be allocated and
provide for enforcement."5 8 This amounts to the establishment
of a property regime to regulate the global commons.5 9  Once
emissions trading rights have been defined and regulated according
to a property framework, efficiency and equity interests can be
promoted indefinitely through international emissions trading.
4.3.1.1. The Normative Implications of
Commodifying the Right to Pollute
Identifying emission allowances as rights available on the free
market has immense normative consequences. Environmental
health has unquantifiable qualities that render the valuation of a
pollution allowance virtually impossible, especially under a
practically non-existent legal regime.' 6  In areas of environmen-
tal regulation, however, where the optimal level of pollution is
155 See discussion regarding the relative bargaining power of developed and
developing nations infra Section 4.3.1.2.
156 See Dunoff, supra note 6, at 254-55; Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at
108-09.
157 Dunoff, supra note 6, at 254.
151 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 84. For a discussion of potential
methods of allocation and concerns over enforcement, see infra Sections
4.3.1.2.-4.3.2.
159 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 84.
160 For the argument that certain relationships, including the relationship
between an individual and the environment, constitute an element of"personhood" and are, therefore, inalienable and should not be commodified,
see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1903-
08 (1987).
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not zero, such as GHG emissions,161 the prospect of commodify-
ing environmental quality appears less offensive.
16 2
By transferring the commodification issue to the international
arena, the already problematic alienability of environmental
quality becomes far more complex. This is due to the rather
intangible, unconfined nature of global environmental degrada-
tion. 63  Robert W. McGee and Walter E. Block,' 64 who advo-
cate the complete privatization of pollution trading rights and
reject current proposals based on legislatively-imposed limits as
"market socialism," 6 ' have conceptualized the problem as one
of mere administrative nuisance.'66 They argue that the "tragedy
of the commons" and concomitant externality problems could be
quickly eradicated through the implementation of a system of full
private property rights in natural entities such as lakes, streams,
and the air." By assigning these entities to private owners,
they would be far less subject to exploitation. 161 McGee and
Block go as far as to posit that, "[w]hile it may not be politically
feasible to privatize the Pacific Ocean in the near future, it is
certainly possible to privatize smaller bodies of water."1 69
Unfortunately for McGee and Block, this questionably idyllic
vision of the planet, severed at every corner by imaginary barbed
wire, is unimaginable on the international level.170
161 The benefits of activities that produce GHGs include "the social product
of farming and commerce." Stone, supra note 39, at 449-50.
162 In response to Radin's ideas regarding the inalienability of relationships
like environmental health, see supra note 160, Sunstein argues that tLe
commodification of harmful conduct through an emissions trading system could
actually have desirable preference-shaping effects by shifting the entitlement to
clean air from the polluter to the public. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 636
n.113.
163 See Developments, supra note 12, at 1492.
'64 Robert W. McGee is a Professor at the W. Paul Stillman School of
Business, Seton Hall University, and Walter E. Block is a Professor of
Economics at the College of the Holy Cross.
165 See Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Pollution Trading Permits as
a Form of Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environ-
mental Pollution, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 51, 52 (1994).
166 See id. at 63-64.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 Id. at 64.
170 McGee and Block argue that "[ilt is clear that the solution to saving




By arguing that a property rights regime governed by
traditional concepts of nuisance will effectively answer to all
questions of environmental justice under a "true" market sys-
tem,17 1 McGee and Block neglect to consider that these legal
fictions do not even exist in most areas of the globe. The law as
it now stands is not equipped to deal with global-scale pollution
of contemporary scope and magnitude. 7 2 Consequently, their
vision is not only "politically infeasible," but suffers from the
same sense of U.S. capitalistic superiority, which provoked a harsh
and resistant response from developing nations at the Berlin
ConferenceY 3
Furthermore, in postulating a system of purely private
property rights that govern all environmental degradation, McGee
and Block far too quickly dismiss many issues traditionally
associated with environmental harm, which are especially acute in
the area of global pollution. These issues include: (1) difficulties
with the traceability of harms; (2) disputes regarding the various
rights of the parties involved in these "private property" disputes
caused by disparate legal regimes and differing concepts of justice;
and (3) the problem of transaction costs.174
Although the market system envisioned by McGee and Block
represents an extreme scenario that would not likely be favored
by developing nations or even most industrialized countries, there
are less drastic possibilities for implementing an international
emissions trading regime. If the efficiency and equity benefits of
trading are taken at face value and accepted as preferable to pure
CAC approaches that are stymied by centralization and outdated
technology, policymakers can move towards designing an effective
trading regime.
Such a system would combine uniform transnational standards
for emissions reduction with market mechanisms to facilitate the
growth of innovative environmental technologies and sustainable
development. One commentator has noted that the development
mammals could be privately "protected" by "fenc[ing] off some larger areas [of
bodies of water], perhaps by laser or sonar technology, so that animals from
one sector would not travel onto another." Id. at 66.
171 See id. at 58 n.24.
172 See Developments, supra note 12, at 1520-21; Stone, supra note 39, at 466.
173 See discussion supra Section 3.
14 See McGee & Block, supra note 166, at 67-76.
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of market-based incentive techniques in environmental regulation
is simply intelligent reform that will render policy more effective
and efficient. 75 Thus, the most important equity issue remain-
ing is not how to eliminate all signs of CAC to establish a
functioning international trading regime, but rather how to
allocate initial emission allowances to ensure that industrialized
and developing countries alike have equal access to the benefits to
be gleaned from that emissions market.
4.3.1.2. Access to the Right to Pollute
The choice of system for distributing pollution rights affects
the access of developed and developing nations with respect to the
benefits of an international trading regime.17 6 For example,
under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, SO2 allowanc-
es are allocated initially'by source, according to a ratio of such
source's emissions to the source's historical levels of fuel
consumption.Y77 One advantage to this historic fuel consump-
tion approach is that the available data is fairly accurate. 8 This
scheme is considered more equitable than allocating emissions
allowances based purely on historic emissions levels because the
latter scheme was conceived as rewarding historically "dirty"
sources with extra allowances.
17 9
It is conceivable that similar reasons might suggest a historic
fuel consumption approach for allocation of permits on the
international level. One commentator, however, firmly believes
that "initial pollution rights should be distributed based upon [a]
per-capita emissions basis, with more rights or titles going to
developing countries so that they may be re-sold to high per-capita
polluters." 180 The equitable and administrative problems with
17 See Wiener Statement, supra note 1.
176 For a thorough review of all the possibilities for initial allocation of
allowances, see Green & Sands, supra note 10, and Stewart & Wiener, supra
note 3, at 110.
177 See 42 U.S.C. S 7651c(a), 765ld(a)-(c) (1990); Thomas E. Skilton, GA T
and the Environment in Conflict The Tuna-Dolphin Dipute and the Quest for an
International Conservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 455, 492 (1993);
Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2712 n.31.
178 See Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2712 n.31 (citing Telephone Interview
with Nancy Kete, Office of Policy Analysis and Review, EPA (Nov. 9, 1989)).
179 See id. at 2712.




this population-based scheme, however, have not been overlooked.
These problems include the difficulty in evaluating historic
emissions against projected emissions when per-capita emissions in
the developing world are increasing quickly.181 There may also
be political objections to an initial distribution of pollution rights
on the basis of population."' Such considerations militate in
favor of implementation of the more readily administered historic
fuel consumption approach.183 It remains questionable whether
this approach would penalize poorer developing countries that
have only been more productive in recent years.
Under the Clean Air Act, once the initial distribution levels
and allotments have been determined, "[the government] leaves
the task of redistribution to the private market. The [1990
a]mendment also employs a zero-revenue auction to distribute a
small portion of the allowances and a zero-revenue direct sale to
ensure that a supply of allowances will be available to new
sources." 184 Some commentators believe that an auction system
should also govern the initial allocation of emissions rights under
an international system.185  By this approach, distribution of
pollution allowances would be purely a function of the free
market, with rights available to the highest bidder.
1 86
On the domestic level, auctioning of allowances theoretically
promotes efficiency and deters hoarding because polluters will
purchase no more allowances than necessary.187  Grandfathering
systems, on the other hand, present efficiency problems because
they facilitate trading only through standard sales. Such a system
enables polluters to hoard allowances for fear that these allowanc-
es will be unavailable in the future.188 Again, it seems question-
181 See id.
182 See Bodansky, supra note 16, at 522 n.434; Stone, supra note 39, at 463.
8 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
184 Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2714; see also 42 U.S.C. S 7651o(c)(6), (d)(3)
("The proceeds of any sale... shall be transferred.., on a pro rata basis to
the owners or operators of the affected units from whom the allowances were
withheld . ... No proceeds of any sale under this subsection shall be ...
treated for any purpose as revenue to the United States . . ").
185 See Interview with Daniel Janzen, Professor of Biology, University of
Pennsylvania, Phila., Pa. (Nov. 29, 1995).
186 See id.
187 See Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2714 n.45.
18 See id. at 2716.
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able whether, on the international level, an auction system would
truly prevent hoarding by richer nations, motivated by economi-
cally irrational political considerations, to the disadvantage of
poorer, less politically savvy developing nations. This situation
cannot be compared with the functioning of an auction under the
Clean Air Act because, on an international scale, all the players do
not "start[] off on an even playing field."" 9
Auctions also create significant administrative expenses. In the
United States, the Clean Air Act provides the EPA with a safety
valve by giving the EPA Administrator the option to "provide for
the conduct of sales or auctions ... by nongovernmental agencies,
groups, or organizations, " '9° thus effectively transferring transac-
tion costs to private entities participating in the auction. On the
international level, it is unlikely that private participants will be
willing to assume the related costs. Further, it is hard to imagine
how the various governmental actors would determine how to
distribute administrative costs among them.19 Furthermore,
these costs might provide additional deterrents to full participation
by poorer developing nations. 
1 2
Nonetheless, auctions may be more equitable at the domestic
level because society owns the entitlement to clean air; charging
polluters to pollute simply facilitates business transactions between
the polluter buyers and public sellers. 93 Thus, an auction func-
tions to establish a much-needed market price for society's right
to enjoy clean air.1 94 By this account, one reason attributed to
the rejection of an auction system as the governing rule for initial
allocation under the Clean Air Act may have been because
Congress did not like the possibility of recognizing the right to
pollute as a fully tradeable property right. 95
Unfortunately, although an auction may function more fairly
within the United States, the equity of this arrangement is not as
apparent on the international level. Between nations, the question
189 Id. at 2717.
'90 42 U.S.C. S 7651o(f).
191 See discussion surrounding conflicts experienced at the Berlin Conference
negotiations supra Sections 3.2.-3.4.
192 See id.
193 See Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 2720.
194 See id.




of who owns the right to pollute is complicated by the necessity
of determining which nation holds that entitlement.196 It also is
unlikely that an auction for initial allocation will guarantee
sufficient access to participation in order to sustain an active
trading market. This problem is due to disproportionate political
bargaining power between rich and poor nations. Additionally,
distributional justice is in conflict with the two competing goals
of environmental health and economic prosperity'1 7
The preceding analysis has led some scholars to dismiss
international emissions trading entirely, maintaining that it is
administratively and politically incredible. For example, one
commentator believes that "permits to emit carbon would rapidly
accumulate in the richest nations, while the developing world
would soon be in a position of having to try and buy back
permits from the richest nations in order to develop .... IT]he
result could be very regressive." '
Although it seems hasty to altogether dismiss the possibility
of a successful, functioning international emissions trading regime,
the above analysis illustrates how an auction system, more
equitable in a competitive domestic market, would serve only to
further polarize North-South economic disparity on a global
scale.199 This scenario directly contravenes one of the objectives
of international emissions trading, the transfer of wealth and
technology from North to South.
Thus, once again, the consequences of endowing the right to
pollute with full legal status emerge. Ironically, if all of humanity
presumptively owns the right to clean air, then those nations with
the least available funds and political influence to purchase those
rights from society must be endowed initially with artificial power
196 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 84.
197 See Stone, supra note 39, at 471.
198 Marchant, supra note 22, at 642 (quoting Michael Grubb, The Greenhouse
Effect" Negotiating Targets, 66 INT'L AFF. 67, 82(1990)). Marchant, an associate
with Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, D.C., makes this assessment in the context
of trading between nations and private entities, and does not totally dismiss the
feasibility of trading uniquely between nations. However, he goes on to predict
that due to the necessity lor periodic renegotiation of national emission quotas,
nations will hesitate to sell any of their emission rights to another country.
This hesitancy, he claims, is rooted in the difficulty that nation will have in
bargaining for the previous quota which endowed it with surplus rights. See
id. at 642 n.60.
199 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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to facilitate access to those rights.200 Some commentators have
suggested a multifaceted approach under which the initial
allocation formula would incorporate elements of historic
emissions and fuel consumption, along with other factors specially
designed to account for the needs of developing countries.2 1
This approach comports with the principal of "additionality" first
enunciated in the Stockholm Declaration.2 Recommendations
107 and 109 of the Declaration establish as an aspirational goal
that environmental problems and needs "should not affect the
flow of assistance," and more importantly, that such assistance
should be sufficient to meet the heightened environmental
requirements of those developing nations.2 3
One commentator suggests that an equitable formula should
include consideration of the relative wealth of the nation,
requiring greater emissions reductions on the part of wealthier
countries." Distribution would be regularly reevaluated based
on changes in wealth to guard against an unfair advantage for
developing nations experiencing spurts in economic growth.0 5
A system initially distributing additional entitlements to poorer
nations is far more equitable because it evens the playing field by
furthering the goals of additionality.
4.3.2. The Institutional Question: Who Should Create,
Administer, and Police Rights to Pollute Under
An International Emissions Trading Regime?0 6
The other necessary component in the construction of a new
property regime in international emissions trading is the establish-
ment of a central organization to distribute, administer, and police
the market.207 The sovereignty issues attached to the develop-
200 See Skilton, supra note 178, at 492.
201 See id.
202 See CALDWELL, supra note 39, at 66.
203 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 132, at 109.
204 See Skilton, supra note 178, at 493.
205 See id.
206 For a discussion of the potential problems surrounding the creation of
an international institutional body for the administration of a global emissions
market, see Green & Sands, supra note 10.
207 See id. The subsidiary bodies of the FCCC have had considerable
trouble coming to a consensus on an appropriate body to administer the




ment of such a transnational body have already been evaluated,
with the conclusion that general principles of international
environmental law, in conjunction with the traditional concept of
sic utere, provide for general protection of participants on that
ground.2"8 Therefore, the fundamental questions become the
technical feasibility and the desired scope of such an institution.
Many commentators believe that there must be some central-
ization of offset record-keeping, 2° as well as a centralized en-
forcement mechanism. 20 Not only will net emissions need to
be monitored, but the system will also necessitate, both on the
national and international levels, a series of central registries.2
Most are optimistic that such a system could be fully operational
and efficient. Presently, the only potential obstacle to the
development of such a body would be the "no credits" restriction
of the JI pilot phase, which by its very nature prohibits such a
creation.213
Of greater concern is the ability of this central body to
effectively enforce the rules of such a regime, a concern more
acute for developing nations whose diminished bargaining power
might lead to their being "sold out" by corrupt regimes who
would profit from underpriced allowance sales and then withdraw
from trading.214 Petricone questions whether equitable enforce-
ment is possible on an international scale,215 while others believe
that a system of temporary leases would solve the dilemma. 16
raised by crediting. Most of the conflict has centered on the AG13's
discussion of the appropriate role for a "multilateral consultative process"
("MCP"). See Report of ihe Meetings, supra note 51.
208 See discussion supra Section 4.2.
209 See discussion of the utilization of a central registry for the EPA's
banking strategies in the United States supra note 23 and accompanying text;
for discussion of banking and the "no credits" restriction under JI, see supra
note 80 and accompanying text.
210 See Green & Sands, supra note 10; Petricone Interview, supra note 56.
211 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 108.
212 See id. ("The additional administrative cost of establishing such a global
'green' SEC should, however, be substantially less than the cost savings and
other benefits obtained by trading, and might be funded through a nominal
charge levied on trades.").
213 See discussion supra Section 3.2.
214 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 109.
215 See Petricone Interview, supra note 56.
216 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 109.
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Even those commentators who are skeptical about the enforceabil-
ity of an international trading regime, however, believe that the
bargaining power of developing countries is improving, especially
in environmental forums.1
The interests of developed and developing nations alike are
best served by subjecting an international trading regime to the
rules of public international law.2"8  As such, the next logical
step is to delegate significant administrative and enforcement
responsibilities to an international environmental body.2 9 The
participation of developing countries is imperative to the success-
ful implementation of a global emissions trading regime.' If
these nations flex their bargaining muscle accordingly, any
transnational institution administering that system will function
both efficiently and equitably.
5. CONCLUSION
The conceptual consensus reached by the parties to the FCCC
in Berlin, and the progress towards fulfilling the objectives of the
Berlin Mandate over the last two years, should be taken as a
positive step forward in the quest to implement an international
emissions trading regime. Although the resistance of many
developing nations to the full realization of a credit system and
the consequent restrictions for the pilot phase of JI may be seen
as a setback, they should be viewed as a reassuring sign that the
poorer nations of the former Third World are making themselves
heard." The fight against global atmospheric degradation is,
217 See supra text accompanying note 93; see also Petricone Interview, supra
note 56 (f[Wn multinational negotiations... northern delegations are larger...
and often better prepared, but there are fewer of them conpared to developing
world delegations. ... I think the trend is for the developing country
delegations to become more sophisticated and better organized on these
issues.").
218 See discussion supra Section 4.2.1.
219 See Dunoff, supra note 6, at 269 ("[A] global environmental body
representing the interests of all parties involved is needed to provide the
collective good of efficacious international environmental law."). Miller
suggests that some of the accounting and compliance functions may be assumed
by a central "bank" such as the Global Environment Facility ("GEF"), the
financial mechanism of the FCCC, established by the World Bank, the UNDP
and the UNEP in 1991. Miller Interview, supra note 1.
220 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.




after all, a global endeavor.
This resistance to crediting also illustrates that the developing
nations understand some of the dangers associated with the idea
of endowing the right to pollute with legal significance. Industri-
alized nations must continue to provide information to policyma-
kers from developing countries regarding the technological,
economic, and equity advantages to be gleaned from trading
regimes and the benefits of plugging private actors into the
equation. Latin American countries, such as Costa Rica, which
stand to benefit tremendously in economic terms, have demon-
strated their enthusiasm for these projects and can provide
invaluable information to other developing countries. If these
efforts are successful, the goals of the pilot phase will be realized
and the year 2000 will see global consensus on the transition to
crediting of GHG emission rights.
From there, there are immense possibilities for the extension
of market mechanisms to other areas of global environmental
regulation. It is possible that climate change became the primary
vehicle for experimentation because it is simpler to justify enforce-
ment for international environmental problems that tangibly affect
everyone.22
Certainly, there are other environmental issues that affect
citizens across the globe. Some commentators have suggested that
trading regimes would effectively address issues like protection of
endangered plants and wildlife and the disposal of hazardous
waste.' As early as 1968, before the EPA began experimenting
with emissions reduction allowances, one scholar was already
proposing the creation of a pollution rights market to control
water pollution. 4  Nearly thirty years later, the international
community is more than ready for the full implementation of
market mechanisms to avert global environmental degradation.
2U See, e.g., Petricone interview, supra note 56 (noting the extreme effects
of climate change on agriculture). Petricone also states that "[tirade in
endangered species or hazardous waste just doesn't have the same universal
'quality of life' or economic effects." Id. This second assertion is open to
debate. See David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species:
Extending the Tradeable Permit Approach From Air Pollution to Habitat
Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 405 (1996), and sources cited therein.
223 See Skilton, supra note 178, at 491.
" See J. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices, in MENELL & STEWART,
supra note 21, at 384-85.
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The compromises reached by the parties to the FCCC at
Berlin in March 1995 illustrate that both the industrialized and
developing nations are ready to take the next step towards
incorporating market mechanisms into the regulation of global
climate change. Given the relatively brief history of international
environmental law and of significant political attention to the
severity of global environmental degradation, these efforts at
cooperation in the area of emissions trading should be viewed as
auspicious and a sign of things to come. Thus, global emissions
trading should be actively pursued as the ultimate goal at the end
of the "no credits" phase of JI.
On January 17, 1997, the Clinton Administration released the
U.S. Draft Protocol Framework ("Draft Protocol") containing
proposals for the "framework compilation" to be compiled by the
AGBM Chair before AGBM-6.? These documents have been
drawn up in preparation for the adoption of a new legal instru-
ment at COP-3 in Kyoto in December 1997, to guide GHG
reduction efforts into the twenty-first century.226 Article 6 of
this Draft Protocol calls unequivocally for the implementation of
an international emissions trading program for those Parties with
emissions budgets, in conjunction with Joint Implementation
projects for those Parties without emissions budgets,' in
meeting the goals of the FCCC. 2
I See U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Draft Protocol Framework, Jan. 17, 1997
[hereinafter Draft Protocol]; U.S. Proposal Pushes Climate Change Issues to Next
Level, OXY-FUEL NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File [hereinafter U.S. Proposal].
226 See U.S. Proposal, supra note 226. The essential elements of the U.S.
Draft Protocol Proposal are -binding targets to limit and reduce GHGs among
developed countries, a medium-term time frame (2010 to 2020), flexibility in
implementation, and participation by developing countries. See Draft Protocol.
22 See Draft Protocol, supra note 226, at art. 7.
2 Article 6.1 of the Draft Protocol states:
An Annex A or Annex B Party that is in compliance with its
obligations under Article 3 (Measurement and Reporting) and that has
in place a national mechanism for certification and verification of
trades, may transfer to, or receive from, any Annex A or Annex B
Party, any of its tonnes of carbon equivalent emissions allowed for a
budget period, for the purpose of meeting its obligations under Article
2 [Emissions Budgets, providing for banking and borrowing of
emissions].
Draft Protocol supra note 226, art. 6.1. Article 6.2 states that a Party may




The Parties to the FCCC therefore must begin negotiations in
1997, in anticipation of the development of the groundwork for
such an international emissions trading regime at Kyoto, (1) to
ensure that developing nations initially will receive excess
pollution credits in accordance with the concepts of additionality
and of sustainable development, and (2) to facilitate broad-based
decision-making regarding distribution and enforcement in a fully
operational international emissions trading regime.
amongst others, to participate in trading. See id. art. 6.2.12
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